The ever-growing list

I'm reading Stasiland, a book of stories about the East German intelligence apparatus that engaged 2% of the population to spy on itself. It's sad, engaging, and absurdly funny at turns.

If, by the mere fact of investigating someone you turn them into an Enemy of the State, you could potentially busy yourself with the entire population.

[The definition of "enemy" becomes] "Too wide," he continues, "to be properly carried out. Within available resources I mean."

Stasiland, pp 200

Which makes me think about various terror watchlists compiled in recent years, with no clear criteria for inclusion or exclusion, which grow longer and longer, and thus mean less and less. When you watch everyone, you watch no one: the Stasi compiled the most pervasive surveillance state so far, but even so they failed to predict its own fall.

So one would assume that list keepers have learned this lesson (let's give them the benefit of the doubt on their competence and intellectual capability). So if these lists are ineffective in detecting or preventing terrorism, then what exactly are they for?

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Of course, one must also never underestimate the power of stupidity: always assume incompetence over conspiracy. It's hard to credit these clowns with carrying out anything successfully.